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The ISO Problem: Decentralized Stochastic Control via Bidding
Schemes
Rahul Singh, P. R. Kumar and Le Xie
Abstract— We consider a smart-grid connecting several
agents, modeled as stochastic dynamical systems, who may
be electricity consumers/producers. At each discrete time
instant, which may represent a 15 minute interval, each
agent may consume/generate some quantity of electrical
energy. The Independent System Operator (ISO) is given
the task of assigning consumptions/generations to the
agents so as to maximize the sum of the utilities accrued to
the agents, subject to the constraint that energy generation
equals consumption at each time.
This task of coordinating generation and demand has to
be accomplished by the ISO without the agents revealing
their system states, dynamics, or utility/cost functions.
We show how and when a simple iterative procedure
converges to the optimal solution. The ISO iteratively
obtains electricity bids by the agents, and declares the
tentative market clearing prices. In response to these
prices, the agents submit new bids.
On the demand side, the solution yields an optimal
demand response for dynamic and stochastic loads. On
the generation side, it provides the optimal utilization of
stochastically varying renewables such as solar/wind, and
generation with fossil fuel based generation with dynamic
constraints such as ramping rates. Thereby we solve a
decentralized stochastic control problem, without agents
sharing any information about their system models, states
or utility functions.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem faced by the electricity grid
operator, called the Independent System Operator (ISO).
If the ISO knows the total demand of the loads, it has
to solve the problem of allocating the required power
among different generators so that the total cost of
production is minimized1. This problem can be solved
by the generators bidding their marginal cost curves,
and the ISO performing the optimization to obtain and
declare the market clearing price. There are also addi-
tional aspects such as assuring that the power flow can
be delivered over the network [1]–[3].
The above deterministic static model with a fixed de-
mand is insufficient for the oncoming era when we want
to maximize the integration of renewable energy sources
such as wind and photo voltaic, which are dynamic and
vary unpredictably with time. Their modeling requires a
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dynamic stochastic system. Dynamic models can also be
used to model features such as ramping constraints that
are important for modeling fossil fuel generators.
When employing renewable energy we need to make
the demand adapt to the availability of renewable en-
ergy, called “demand response”, in contrast to the tra-
ditional scenario where demand is inflexible and supply
needs to match whatever demand is. Loads generally
have dynamic constraints, since, for example, air condi-
tioners can be deferred for a while but not indefinitely.
So loads also need to be modeled as dynamic control
systems. Further, since environmental variables such as
temperature are involved, they may be uncertain, and
hence will also generally need to modeled as stochastic
dynamic systems.
Such dynamic models can also model storage devices
where the state is the amount of energy stored, and
prosumers, such as homes with solar panels, which
may switch at uncertain times from being consumers to
generators. Therefore we model all the agents involved
as stochastic dynamical systems.
The goal in operating this system is to maximize the
sum of the utilities of all the agents. There are however
several constraints on information sharing that need to
be respected. Individual agents may be averse to sharing
system states with each other. They may not even be
willing to share their individual system models or their
individual utility functions for several reasons ranging
from the competitive nature of commercial enterprises,
to protecting privacy of consumers’ home states.
The overall systemwide optimality of such a system is
sought to be achieved by the ISO. It needs to both de-
termine the optimal demand response over time, as well
as allocate generation over time among the lowest cost
generators, in the face of stochastic uncertainty, and to
do so at minimum systemwide cost. The ISO would like
to achieve this by simply determining prices and leaving
each agent to its own selfish utility maximization, as in
general equilibrium theory [4].
Our main results are the following. We establish it-
erative interaction processes such as tatonnement [5]
under which the ISO can indeed perform this task for
certain stochastic dynamic systems. We also address the
complexity of this task under several scenarios. In the
case where the agents can be modeled as linear Gaussian
stochastic systems and the cost functions are quadratic,
we show that a simple scheme not involving contingent
markets yields the systemwide global optimum.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a smart-grid consisting of M agents which
may be generators, loads, prosumers or storage devices,
each modeled as a stochastic dynamical system. The
following are the key ingredients of our system:
1) Randomness is modeled through a probability
space (Ω,F ,P). The “state of the world” ω ∈
Ω, and captures “random” phenomena such as
weather, wind-speed, coal shortage, or a dam-
aged wind-turbine. It affects agent i through
the random processes Ni(ω, t) and Nc(ω, t) t =
0, 1, 2, . . . , T − 1. We regard Nc(t) as a “common”
uncertainty that affects and is known to causally
by all agents (e.g., temperature of a city), while
Ni(t) is a “private” uncertainty specific and known
causally only to agent i. We denote by Ft the
sigma algebra generated by all the noises up to
and including time t.
2) Agents: Each agent i has a state Xi(t) at time t
known to it, that evolves as,
Xi(t+ 1) = f
t
i (Xi(t), Ui(t), Ni(t), Nc(t)), (1)
where Ui(t) ∈ R is the amount of electricity sup-
plied (negative if consumed) to the grid by agent
i at time t. Each discrete time instant corresponds
to a 15-minute interval of the real-time market
implemented by the ISO.
3) One-step Cost function of an agent i, ci(xi, ui)
(or its negative, a one-step utility function
−ci(xi, ui)). For producers, this cost could be due
to labor, coal, etc.. For consumers, this could repre-
sent the cost incurred due to the high temperature
of house/business facility, or the cost incurred due
to a delay in performing a task resulting from non-
purchase of electricity.
4) System Operating Cost is the expected value of the
sum of the finite horizon total costs incurred over
the time duration {0, 1, 2, . . . , T } by all the agents,
E
(
T∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
ci (Xi(t), Ui(t))
)
. (2)
The time horizon T can, for example, be 96 which
corresponds to one day. It is the total electricity
generation cost minus the utility provided to the
consumers.
5) Energy Balance Constraint: The basic constraint
that we will focus on is that total generation
must equal total consumption at each time t, i.e.,∑N
i=1 Ui(t) = 0 at each time t.
6) The ISO is an agency that accepts electricity pur-
chase/sale bids that are submitted by the agents
for each time slot t = 0, 1, . . . , T . In our model,
we allow for the agents and ISO to iterate on the
bids before the market clearing price is declared.
Once the iterations have converged, the ISO de-
clares the market clearing prices, and the agents
generate/consume the agreed electrical energies
at the declared prices.
III. THE ISO PROBLEM
The ISO problem is to solve the following constrained
stochastic dynamic control problem,
minE
{
T∑
t=0
M∑
i=1
ci (Xi(t), Ui(t))
}
such that
∑
i
Ui(t) = 0, t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,
and Xi(t+ 1) = f
t
i (Xi(t), Ui(t), Ni(t), Nc(t)), for
i = 1, 2, . . . ,M, and t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1.
(ISO Problem)
The expectation above is taken with respect to the
combined uncertainty or “noise” process N(t) :=
(N1(t), N2(t), . . . , NM (t), Nc(t)) for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1.
The noises {N1(t), N2(t), . . . , NM (t), Nc(t)} may be
dependent random variables. There can also be depen-
dence across time.
IV. PROBLEM STATEMENT, KEY QUESTIONS AND GOALS
The key issues of interest are the following:
1) Since the ISO Problem is a decentralized con-
trol problem with non-classical information struc-
turel [6], [7], we would like to know whether it is
possible to achieve the exact optimal performance
as attained by centralized control. As our analysis
will show, the ISO is able to attain optimal coordi-
nation amongst the M dynamic systems through
announced “prices” under some conditions.
2) Decentralized Optimization and Sufficient Statistics
The ISO Problem can be viewed as a constrained
Markov Decision Process (MDP) [8]. The current
state of our knowledge does not allow us to
handle general MDPs with different observation
patterns and different cost functions. Our scheme
establishes certain “sufficient statistics” for each
agent to make optimal decisions in a decentralized
environment [9], [10].
We will show that there exist simple “iterative bidding
schemes” (IBS) which yield the same performance as
that of the optimal centralized controller under some
models.
V. RELATED WORKS
No similar results appear to be known for the general
decentralized stochastic control problem. Team prob-
lems have been extensively studied, e.g., [7], [11], but
the formulations are very restrictive in that each agent
needs to know the system dynamics of the other agents.
Even when the models are known, there are still con-
siderable difficulties in decentralized stochastic control.
When agents do not share observations, severe complex-
ity can set in, even in an otherwise linear quadratic
Gaussian problem, as pointed out by Witsenhausen in
his counterexample of a two stage problem [6]. The
role of observation, signaling [7], and the trade-off
between communication and control, are evident from
this counterexample [6]. There are some recent struc-
tural results [12] and on sufficient statistics [13] under
the restrictive assumption that the agents know the
dynamics of all other agents. But the proposed solutions
suffer from the curse of dimensionality.
We show below that the ISO Problem is an example of
a decentralized control system with non-classical obser-
vation patterns in which signaling can successfully result
in globally optimum performance. The agents need not
reveal their observations, state values, their individual
system dynamics or their individual cost-functions. We
construct concrete signaling schemes which encode-
decode the information required in order to recover
the same performance as that of centralized control.
From the economics side, this work is an extension of
general equilibrium theory [14]. To the authors’ knowl-
edge there does not appear to be any similar result for
coordinating multiple LQG systems or the efficiency of
the simplified signaling.
In the setting of the energy market, [15], [16] discuss
a general framework for the operation of an electicity
grid via the establishment of a marketplace in which the
electricity purchases are done on the basis of spot prices.
Thus, electrical energy is treated as a commodity which
can be bought, sold, and traded, taking into account its
time-and space-varying values and costs, and a frame-
work is presented for the establishment of an energy
marketplace. Our results can be viewed as providing
guidelines for the operation of this marketplace via
simple bidding schemes when the agents are nonlinear
stochastic dynamical systems. Our scheme maximize the
net social utlity.
Viewed from the power system end, there have been
many efforts since the deregulation of the electricity sec-
tor on a market-based framework to clear the system. Ilic
et al. [17] have proposed a two-layered approach that
internalizes individual constraints of market participants
while allowing the ISO to manage the spatial complexity.
The approximated MPC algorithm is shown to perform
well in many realistic applications.
In order to analyze the strategic interactions between
the ISO and market participants, game theoretical ap-
proaches have been proposed, e.g., Zhu et al [18] uses
a Stackelberg game framework for studying economic
dispatch with demand response. Wang et al [19] pose
the problem as a noncooperative game, and prove the
existence of a Nash equilibrium under some assumtpi-
ons.
One of the major challenges we address is how to
elicit optimal demand response without revealing the
inherent dynamic models of the loads to the ISO.
VI. A TREE VISUALIZATION OF SYSTEM RANDOMNESS
A tree visualization of the system randomness will be
insightful in the discussions to follow; see Fig 1. The
combined system comprising of all theM agents evolves
as,
X(t+ 1) = f t(X(t), U(t), N(t)). (3)
Let us assume for the time being that the noise process
N(t) is allowed to assume only finitely many values at
each time. We can then construct an uncertainty tree of
depth T , in which the root node corresponds to initial
system state, and every path from the root to a leaf
node corresponds to a unique realization of the noise
sequence (N(0), N(1), . . . , N(T − 1)).
Initial State (x1, x2)
N1(2) = 0 N1(2) = 1
N2(1) = 0
N1(2) = 0 N1(2) = 1
N2(1) = 1
N1(0) = 0
N1(2) = 0 N1(2) = 1
N2(1) = 0
N1(2) = 0 N1(2) = 1
N2(1) = 1
N1(0) = 1
Fig. 1. A Tree based visualization of randomness for a two agent
system evolving over three bid times. The noise values are allowed to
be binary, 0 or 1.
VII. ITERATIVE BIDDING SCHEMES
The key contribution of this work is to propose solu-
tions to the ISO Problem in the form of Iterative Bidding
Schemes (IBS), as in Walrasian tatonnement [4]. Such
schemes intertwine two simple processes, which we call
Bid Update and Price Update. We begin by defining two
key elements of the IBS, the bid function and the price
function.
Bid Function: A bid sequence by agent i specifies to
the ISO how much electricity that agent will purchase
(negative if supplying) in every time period from that
time till the final time. At time t it is a sequence of the
form (Ui(t), Ui(t+1), . . . , Ui(T )). A bid function (in short
just “bid”) specifies the bid sequence, as a function of the
past history of observed noise N(s), s < t. In Figure 1
the bid function of each agent simply specifies, for each
node in the tree, the amount of electricity that agent i is
willing to purchase when the system passes through that
node if it ever does so. We note that Ui(ω, t) is adapted
to the filtration Ft. The bid function of agent i will be
denoted by Ui.
A price function is a function announced by the ISO,
which specifies for each time t, as a function of the
past history of noise N(s), s < t, the price λ(t) at
which electricity will be sold/bought in the market. In
the tree example of Figure 1, this corresponds to the
market clearing price corresponding to each node of the
tree. The price function {λ(ω, t)} is also an Ft-adapted
stochastic process, which will be denoted by λ.
Bid Update: Let us suppose, for the time being, that
the ISO has somehow declared a price function λ. In the
Bid Update, each agent i changes its bid in response to
the price function λ. In order to derive its new bid, it
solves the following problem, dubbed Agent i’s Problem,
minE
{
T∑
t=0
ci(Xi(t), Ui(t)) + λ(t)Ui(t)
}
.
It maximizes agent i’s total net utility, defined as the
utility −ci(Xi(t)) it derives from its state being Xi(t),
minus the amount λ(t)Ui(t) it pays for the electricity.
Price Update The ISO updates the price function in
response to the agents having submitted their updated
bids. Since in our context here the sole purpose of the
ISO is to make sure that the net demand equals net
supply, we will consider a simple rule by which it raises
prices if demand exceeds supply and reduces otherwise,
i.e., guided by the excess consumption function. Suppose
the previous price was λk and the bid was Uk. Then, the
Price Update is,
λk+1(t) = λk(t) (1− αk) + αk
(∑
i
Uki (t)
)
where αk > 0 is an “adaptation gain”. We employ the
choice αk = 1/k, which satisfies the twin conditions∑∞
k=0 αk = ∞, and
∑∞
k=0 α
2
k < +∞, a common con-
vergence condition in stochastic approximation [20].
It will be the object of the following section, to show
that an iteration of Bid Update-Price Update can solve
the ISO Problem under some conditions.
VIII. THE DETERMINISTIC CASE
First we consider the ISO Problem for deterministic
systems,
min
T∑
t=0
M∑
i=1
ci (xi(t), ui(t))
such that
∑
i
ui(t) = 0, for t = 0, 1, . . . , T,
and xi(t+ 1) = f
t
i (xi(t), ui(t)), for
i = 1, 2, . . . ,M, and t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1. (4)
The intermediate variables xi(t) can be expressed in
terms of the inputs ui := (ui(1), ui(2), . . . , ui(T − 1))
and thus the cost term
∑T
t=1
∑M
i=1 ci (xi(t), ui(t)) can
also be expressed solely as a function of the inputs
ui, i = 1, 2 . . . ,M . Convexity plays a major role, as noted
by Arrow [4].
Assumption 1 (Convexity Assumption): For
i = 1, 2, . . . ,M , the function
∑T
t=1 ci (xi(t), ui(t)) is
convex in the input vector (ui(1), ui(2), . . . , ui(T − 1)).
We will now derive a solution to the ISO Problem under
Assumption 1, and show that it achieves the same
performance as that of optimal centralized control.
The cost is convex in the vectors ui. Employing the
definition of each xi(t) as f
t
i (xi(t− 1), ui(t− 1)), the
associated Lagrangian and dual function are given by,
L (u, λ) : =
M∑
i=1
{
T∑
t=0
ci(xi(t)) + λ(t)ui(t)
}
,
D(λ) : = min
u
L (u, λ) ,
where u := (u1, u2, . . . , uM ), and λ :=
(λ(0), λ(1), . . . , λ(T − 1)). The Lagrangian is the
sum of the costs incurred by each individual agent.
Hence, given the Lagrange multipliers λ, the inputs
ui minimizing the Lagrangian can be calculated in a
decentralized fashion, with each agent i solving its own
problem called Agent i’s Problem
min
T∑
t=0
ci(xi(t)) + λ(t)ui(t), (5)
subject to xi(t+ 1) = f
t
i (xi(t), ui(t))
for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1.
Each agent i then submits this optimal ui(·) to the ISO as
its bid. This enables the computation of the dual function
for each value of λ.
Note that the sub-gradient with re-
spect to λ of the Dual function D(λ) is(∑
i u
k
i (0),
∑
i u
k
i (1), . . . ,
∑
i u
k
i (T − 1)
)
. Since the
dual problem of finding the prices λ that maximize
D(λ) is convex, it can be solved via the sub-gradient
iteration [21]–[23].
λk+1(t) = λk(t) (1− αk) + αk
(∑
i
uki (t)
)
, t ≥ 0, (6)
where k is the index which keeps track of the iteration
number. The iterations end when the price vector λ(t)
converges to the optimal value λ⋆(t). The resulting
solution is optimal for the ISO Problem due to the
convexity assumptions.
IX. PRIVATELY OBSERVED NOISE
Suppose that even though the agents do not observe
the private noises of other agents, or know their system
dynamics or utility functions, they know the laws of the
combined noise process, L(N(t)). That is, in the context
of the uncertainty tree of Section VI, the agents know
the topology of the tree, and the transition probabilities
along the edges.
We will now show that under the following convexity
assumption, the ISO Problem has an optimal solution.
Assumption 2: The function∑
t
ci(Xi(t), Ui(t)), i = 1, 2, . . . ,M, (7)
is convex in the vector {Ui(t), t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1} for
fixed noise sequence.
The algorithm presented is iterative, and composed of
Bid-Price updates. The bid submitted by each agent i
at time s is a random process that maps the space
Ω×{s, s+ 1, . . . , T − 1} to R. This is akin to Arrow’s [4]
approach of treating each good available at a certain
time and place as a separate good. The bid process is
adapted to the filtration Ft. At each time t, it specifies
to the ISO, as a function of the past noise N(s), s < t, the
amount of electricity that the agent is willing to purchase
at time t. Only the initial bid, Ui(s) is implemented
at time s, as in Model Predictive Control. Figure 2
summarizes the algorithm.
Theorem 1: Algorithm 1 solves the ISO Problem when
the cost functions satisfy Assumption 2, with each agent
i having access only to its private noise Ni(t) and the
common noise Nc(t), with the law of the combined noise
process, i.e., L(N(t)), being known publicly.
Proof: Let us first consider the special case where
there is only a commonly observed noise Nc and there
are no private noises, called the Commonly Observed
Noise Problem. Suppose for simplicity of visualization
the noise processN(t) assumes only finitely many values
allowing it to be represented by a tree as in Fig. 1.
Let us suppose that x(0) is fixed, without loss of
generality. Let pv denote the probability of node v
in the uncertainty tree. The depth of the node in
the tree indicates time. Every Markov policy, mapping
states and time to actions, specifies an action U(v) :=
(U0(v), U1(v), . . . , UM (v)) satisfying
∑
i Ui(v) = 0 for
every node v in the tree. This is easily seen by recursion
starting at the root which corresponds to the initial time
and state of the system, and noting that each node
then also indicates the state of the system at that time.
Now consider also a more general “tree policy” that
specifies a U(v) := (U0(v), U1(v), . . . , UM (v)) satisfying∑
i Ui(v) = 0 for every node v in the tree. It is more
general than a Markov policy since two nodes in the
tree at the same depth may correspond to the same state
X(t) but a tree policy is allowed to prescribe different
actions for them. Hence the class of tree policies also
contains an optimal policy.
For every such tree policy, for every node v, there is a
unique sequence of actions Uv := {U(0), U(1), . . . , U(t)}
that was taken in the preceding t steps, where t denotes
the depth of the node v. The state X(t) at time t
corresponding to the node v is thereby determined by
(v, uv). The centralized optimization problem can then
be written as the following optimization problem,
min
M∑
i=1
∑
v
pvci (v, U
v)
such that
∑
i
Ui(v) = 0, ∀v.
Note that ci(v, u) is convex in u. Hence this is a convex
programming problem with no duality gap. Associating
Lagrange multiplier λ(v) with the constraint
∑
i Ui(v) =
0, and letting λ := {λ(v)}, we obtain,
L (U, λ) : =
M∑
i=1
∑
v
pv
{∑
v
ci(v, u
v) + λ(v)Ui(v)
}
.
We will call the process λ(v) as the “price process”. Each
agent submits a bid for each possible partial realization
v of the noise process, while the ISO specifies a price
at each v. Now the proof parallels the proof in the
deterministic case.
This proof extends to the case where there are also
private noises. At time 0, there are no private noises
Ni(−1), and so the above proof holds at time 0. Noting
this, it follows that the result also holds at each time s ≥
1 since the bid-price iteration is repeated at each such
time, and we can simply regard s as the new “initial”
time.
Algorithm 1
Assumption: The law of the combined noise process
L(N) is common knowledge of all agents and ISO.
for bidding times s = 0 to T − 1 do
k = 0
repeat
Each agent i solves the problem
minE


∑
t≥s
ci(Xi(t), Ui(t)) + λ
k(t)Ui(t)

 ,
(Agent i’s Problem)
with initial condition Xi(s) for the optimal
{Uki (t), s ≤ t ≤ T − 1}, and submits it to ISO.
ISO declares new price, i.e.
λk+1(t) = λk(t) (1− αk) + αk
(∑
i
Uki (t)
)
,
for times t ≥ s.
k → k + 1
until Uki (t) converges a.s. to U
⋆
i (t), ∀t ≥ s
ISO implements U⋆i (s)
end for
We note that the assumption of the common knowledge
of L(N(t)) can be removed by utilizing the technique
of Stochastic Approximation or other learning tech-
niques [20], [24], [25], so that the agents can “learn”
the laws L(N(t)).
The above algorithm above is exponentially complex
in T due to the number of possible states in the tree,
even when there are only two possible values for each
Ni(t). In the next section we will see that we can
dramatically simplify the algorithm in the LQG context.
X. THE CASE OF LINEAR SYSTEMS
This section treats the special case of the ISO Problem
when the M agents have linear Gaussian dynamics and
quadratic costs. The noises of all agents are independent
and mean zero. Each agent i has a quadratic cost crite-
rion, i.e., the cost functions ci(xi, ui) = x
⊺
iQixi+u
⊺
iRiui
are quadratic, with weighting matrices Qi ≥ 0 and
Ri > 0 . Let us call this the Distributed Constrained
LQG (DCLQG) Problem:
minE
(
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
X⊺i (t)QiXi(t) + U
⊺
i (t)RiUi(t)
)
subject to Xi(t+ 1) = AiXi(t) +BiUi(t) +BiNi(t),
t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
and
∑
i
Ui(t) = 0, t = 0, . . . , T − 1. (8)
(The case of time-varying systems is analogous to time-
invariant systems, and omitted for brevity) We will
assume that the system dynamics given by (Ai, Bi), the
cost functions given by (Qi, Ri), and the observation
structure are all private, i.e., none of the agents have
knowledge of the system parameters or the costs of the
other agents, and that the state process Xi is observed
only by the agent i.
We will derive an Iterative Bidding Scheme which
is much simpler than the algorithm proposed in Sec-
tion IX in the following critical aspect: The bid func-
tion submitted at time t specifying the quantity of
electricity that agent i is willing to purchase at times
t, t + 1, . . . , T − 1 does not depend on the outcomes
of noise sequence N(s), s ≥ t. It is simply a vector
(ui(t), ui(t + 1), . . . , ui(T − 1)) comprising of T − t + 1
entries. This is a drastic reduction in complexity of the
bidding scheme. At each time t, the following iteration
takes place: Each agent bids a vector of future purchases
corresponding to a deterministic certainty equivalent
system, in response to prices announced by the ISO for
future power, and the ISO updates the prices in return,
until convergence.
Definition 1 (Certainty Equivalence): A stochastic con-
trol problem is said to possess the property of certainty
equivalence if the optimal policy for the stochastic con-
trol problem coincides with the optimal policy for the
corresponding deterministic control problem in which
the noise is absent.
Theorem 2: The following bidding scheme achieves
optimality for the ISO Problem with LQG agents. At each
time s, in respose to the k-th iterate of the price sequence
(λk(s), λk(s+ 1), . . . , λk(T )), agent i announces the op-
timal open loop sequence (uki (s), u
k
i (s + 1), . . . , u
k
i (T ))
for the deterministic LQ problem:
min
∑
t≥s
x⊺i (t)Qixi(t) + u
⊺
i (t)Riui(t) + λ
k(t)ui(t)
s.t. xi(t+ 1) = Aixi(t) +Biui(t)
for t = s, s+ 1, . . . , T − 1.
In response, the ISO adjusts the prices according to:
λk+1(t) = λk(t) (1− αk) + αk
(∑
i u
k
i (t)
)
, t ≥ s. This
process is iterated till it converges to (u⋆i (s), u
⋆
i (s +
1), . . . , u⋆i (T − 1)) and (λ
⋆(s), λ⋆(s + 1), . . . , λ⋆(T − 1)).
At time s, the price is set at λ⋆(s) and agent i applies
the input u⋆i (s).
Algorithm 2
for bidding times s = 0 to T − 1 do
k = 0
Initialize λk(t), t ≥ s to some arbitrary value.
repeat
Each agent i solves the problem
min
T∑
t≥s
x⊺i (t)Qixi(t) + u
⊺
i (t)Riui(t) + λ
k(t)ui(t)
(9)
and submits the optimal values, denoted uki (t) for
t ≥ s to the ISO.
ISO updates the prices,
λk+1(t) = λk(t) (1− αk) + αk
(∑
i
uki (t)
)
,
for times t ≥ s.
Increment k by 1
until uki (t) converges to u
⋆
i (t)
implement u⋆(s)
end for
The key to showing the existence of such a simple
bidding scheme lies in utilizing the certainty equivalence
property of LQG systems [26]. Proof: Let
x := (x1, x2, . . . , xM ), u := (u1, u2, . . . , uM ),
A := diag(A1, A2, . . . , AM ), B := diag(B1, B2, . . . , BM ),
Q = diag(Q1, Q2, . . . , QM ), R = diag(R1, R2, . . . , RM ),
and consider the following deterministic linear,
quadratic regulator (LQR) problem with no noise, but
featuring the energy balance constraint,
min
T∑
t=0
x⊺(t)Qx(t) + u⊺(t)Ru(t) (10)
subject to x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bu(t), (11)
M∑
i=1
ui(t) = 0 for t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Since the state is affine in u, the cost is convex in u.
Hence this centralized problem can be solved by the Bid-
Price iteration between the agents and the ISO as shown
for the deterministic problem. In particular, at time 0,
the end result of the scheme is the optimal action u(0).
This is arrived at by the ISO announcing a sequence of
prices for all future times and the agents bidding their
consumptions/generation sequences at all future times.
Now note that due to the energy balance at each time,
Start
ISO declares prices for times t ≥ s
Agents solve their problem
Agents submit updated bids
Bids converged?
Update
Prices
Implement the first entry of the converged
bids, i.e., U⋆i (s). Agents update states
Xi(s + 1) = f
s
i (Xi(s), U
⋆
i (s), Ni(s))
Increment time s by one
Is s = T ?
Stop
yes
yes
no
no
Fig. 2. Decision flow in Algorithm 1.
agent M is forced to choose uM (t) = −
∑M−1
i ui(t)
for all t. Hence one can substitute this value for uM (t)
and obtain a standard LQR problem where there is no
separate energy balance constraint. For this reduced
and standard deterministic linear quadratic regulator
problem, the optimal solution is given by linear feedback
u(0) = Γ(0)x(0), where Γ(·) is the optimal feedback
gain.
Now consider the corresponding reduced stochastic
LQG problem where there is white Gaussian noise in
the state equations (11). By Certainty Equivalence [26],
the same feedback law as in the deterministic reduced
LQR problem is also optimal. In particular, in state x(0)
at time 0, u(0) = Γ(0)x(0) continues to be optimal. Now,
in our proposed bidding scheme for the LQG problem,
each agent bids on the basis of a private deterministic
system for itself. Hence it leads to the same Bid-Price
iteration result at time 0. Hence it arrives at the same
u(0), which however is also optimal for the stochastic
LQG problem.
Thus we see that the Bid-Price iteration scheme de-
termines the optimal actions for the agents at time 0.
Now our scheme for the LQG problem repeats such a
Bid-Price scheme iteration at each time t. Each x(t) can
be regarded as an initial state for the system started at
time t, and the same argument as above shows that the
actions u(t) that it results in for the agents at all times
t are also optimal.
We note the following important aspects of the proposed
algorithm. The critical feature that there is an iteration
of bids at each time t is important. Also important is
that at each stage it is the future sequence of prices that
is iterated.
It should be noted that the alternative of announcing
a “bid curve” of price vs. generation for a single time t
does not work in the dynamic case. The reason is that
the current optimal generation depends on future prices,
so iteration of price at only one time is not sufficient
to ensure optimal decisions when agents are dynamic
systems.
XI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have posed the ISO Problem of maximizing the
total utility/minimizing the total operating cost of the
electricity grid, while not allowing the revelations of
the dynamics, states or utilities of the agent. It is more
complex than a decentralized stochastic control problem
due to the non-revelation feature. We have shown that
when the agents are LQG systems the problem admits
a simple solution utilizing iterative bidding schemes,
and attains the same performance as that of an optimal
centralized control policy. Under the proposed policy, the
sufficient statistics are vastly simplified, and each agent i
needs to only keep track of its present stateXi(t). This is
in contrast to the general case of decentralized stochastic
control, in which the agents need to keep track of the
entire history in order to implement an optimal policy,
which is in any case generally intractable to compute.
Thus not only is our Algorithm decentralized, and easy
to implement, but it also leads to a large amount of data
reduction. We further note that our Algorithm is privacy
preserving.
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